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Privacy-Preserving Release of Spatio-temporal
Density
Gergely Acs, Gergely Biczo´k, and Claude Castelluccia
Abstract In today’s digital society, increasing amounts of contextually rich spatio-
temporal information are collected and used, e.g., for knowledge-based decision
making, research purposes, optimizing operational phases of city management,
planning infrastructure networks, or developing timetables for public transportation
with an increasingly autonomous vehicle fleet. At the same time, however, publish-
ing or sharing spatio-temporal data, even in aggregated form, is not always viable
owing to the danger of violating individuals’ privacy, along with the related legal
and ethical repercussions. In this chapter, we review some fundamental approaches
for anonymizing and releasing spatio-temporal density, i.e., the number of individ-
uals visiting a given set of locations as a function of time. These approaches follow
different privacy models providing different privacy guarantees as well as accuracy
of the released anonymized data. We demonstrate some sanitization (anonymiza-
tion) techniques with provable privacy guarantees by releasing the spatio-temporal
density of Paris, in France. We conclude that, in order to achieve meaningful accu-
racy, the sanitization process has to be carefully customized to the application and
public characteristics of the spatio-temporal data.
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1 Introduction
Spatio-temporal, geo-referenced datasets are growing rapidly nowadays. With bil-
lions of location-aware devices in use worldwide, the large scale collection of space-
time trajectories of people produces gigantic mobility datasets. Such datasets are in-
valuable for traffic and sustainable mobility management, or studying accessibility
to services. Even more, they can help understand complex processes, such as the
spread of viruses or how people exchange information, interact, and develop social
interactions. While the benefits provided by these datasets are indisputable, their
publishing or sharing is not always viable owing to the danger of violating individ-
uals’ privacy, along with the related legal and ethical repercussions. This problem
is socially relevant: companies and researchers are reluctant to publish any mobility
data by fear of being held responsible for potential privacy breaches. This limits our
ability to analyze such large datasets to derive information that could benefit the
general public.
Unsurprisingly, personal mobility data reveals tremendous sensitive information
about individuals’ behavioural patterns such as health life or religious/political be-
liefs. Somewhat more surprisingly, such mobility data is also unique to individu-
als even in a relatively large population containing millions of users. For instance,
only four spatio-temporal positions are enough to uniquely identify a user 95% of
the times in a dataset of one and a half million users [13], even if the dataset is
pseudonymized, i.e., identitifiers such as personal names, phone numbers, home ad-
dress are suppressed. Moreover, the top 2 mostly visited locations of an individual
is still unique with a probability of 10-50% [63] among millions of users. Notice
that the most visited locations, such as home and working places, are easy to learn
today from different social media where people often publicly reveal this seemingly
harmless personal information. Therefore, publishing mobility datasets would put at
risk our own privacy; if someone knows where we live and work could potentially
find our record and learn all of our potentially sensitive location visits. Moreover,
due to the large uniqueness of records, these datasets are regarded as personal in-
formation under several laws and regulations internationally, such as overall in the
European Union. Therefore, their release prompt not only serious privacy concerns
but also possible monetary penalties [18].
1.1 Privacy implications of aggregate location data
One might argue that publishing aggregate information, such as the number of in-
dividuals at a given location, is enough to reconstruct aggregate mobility patterns,
and has no privacy implications. Indeed, aggregated information is usually related to
large groups of individuals and is seemingly safe to disclose. However, this reason-
ing is flawed as shown next. First, an attack is described that can reconstruct even
entire individual trajectories from aggregate location data, if aggregates are period-
ically and sufficiently frequently published (e.g., in every half an hour). We also
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illustrate the potential privacy threats of irregularly published aggregate location
data, for example, when a querier (or the adversary) specifies the spatio-temporal
points whose visits are then aggregated and released.
Consequently, aggregation per se do not necessarily prevent privacy breaches,
and we need additional countermeasures to guarantee privacy for individuals even
in a dataset of aggregate mobility data such as spatio-temporal densities.
1.1.1 Reconstruction from periodically published aggregate data
The attack described in [61] successfully reconstructed more than 70% of 100 000
trajectories merely from the total number of visits at 8000 locations, which were
published every half an hour over a whole week in a large city. The attack exploits
three fundamental properties of location trajectories:
Predictability: The current location of an individual can be accurately predicated
from his previous location because consecutively visited locations are usually ge-
ographically close. This implies that trajectories can be well-separated in space;
if two trajectories are far away in time t then they remain so in time (t + 1) as-
suming that t and t+1 are not too distant in time.
Regularity: Most people visit very similar (or the same) locations every day. In-
deed, human mobility is governed by daily routines and hence periodic. For ex-
ample, people go to work/school and return home at almost the same time every
day.
Uniqueness: Every person visits quite different locations than any other person
even in a very large population, which has already been demonstrated by several
studies. For example, any four locations of an individual trajectory are unique to
that trajectory with a probability of more than 95% for one and a half million
individuals [13].
The attack has three main phases. In the first phase, it reconstructs every trajec-
tory within every single day by exploiting the predictability of trajectories. This is
performed by finding an optimal match of locations between consecutive time slots,
where geographically close locations are more likely to be matched. After the first
phase, we have the daily fragments of every trajectory, but we do not know which
fragments belong to the same trajectory. Hence, in the second phase, complete tra-
jectories are reconstructed by identifying their daily fragments. This is feasible due
to the regularity and uniqueness properties of trajectories, i.e. every trajectory has
similar daily fragments which are also quite different from the fragments of other
trajectories. Similarity of fragments can be measured by the frequency of visits per
location within a fragment. Finally, in the last phase, re-identification of individu-
als are carried out by using the uniqueness property again; a few locations of any
individual known from external sources (e.g., social media) will single out the in-
dividual’s trajectory [13]. As individual trajectories are regarded as personal data
in several regulations internationally, the feasibility of this attack demonstrates that
aggregate location data can also be regarded as personal data.
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1.1.2 Reconstruction from irregularly published aggregate data
Another approach of releasing spatio-temporal density is to answer some counting
queries executed on the location trajectories. The querier is interested in the num-
ber of people whose trajectories satisfy a specified condition (e.g., the number of
trajectories which contain a certain hospital). Queries can be filtered instantly by an
auditor, e.g. all queries which have too small support, say less than k (i.e., only k
trajectories satisfy the condition), are simply refused to answer. However, this ap-
proach is not enough to prevent privacy breaches; if the support of two queries are
both greater than k, their difference can still be 1. For instance, the first query may
ask for the number of people who visited a hospital, and the second query for the
number of people who visited the same hospital except locations L1 and L2. If the
querier knows that L1 and L2 are unique to John then it learns whether John visited
the hospital.
Defenses against such differencing attacks are not straightforward. For example,
verifying whether the answers of two or more queries disclose any location visit can
be computationally infeasible; if the query language is sufficiently complex there
is no efficient algorithm to decide whether two queries constitute a differencing at-
tack [30]. In Section 3.1, we show more principled techniques to recover individual
location visits from the answers of a given query set.
1.2 Applications of spatio-temporal density
Spatio-temporal density data, albeit aggregated in nature, can enable a wide variety
of optimization use cases by providing a form of location awareness, especially in
the context of the Smart City concept [46]. Depending on both its spatial and tem-
poral granularity, such data can be useful for optimizing the (i) design and/or (ii)
operational phases of city management with regard to e.g., public transportation, lo-
cal businesses or emergency preparedness. Obviously, spatial resolution determines
the scale of such optimization, e.g., whether we can tell a prospective business owner
to open her new cafe in a specific district or a specific street. On the other hand, it
is the temporal granularity of density data that separates the application scenarios in
terms of design and operational use cases.
In case of low temporal granularity (i.e., not more than a few data points per area
per day), city officials can use the data for optimizing design tasks such as:
• planning infrastructure networks, such as new roads, railways or communication
networks;
• advising on the location of new businesses such as retail, entertainment and food;
• developing timetables for public transportation;
• deploying hubs for urban logistics systems such as post, vehicle depos (e.g., for
an urban bike rental system), electric vehicle chargers and even city maintenance
personnel;
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In case of high temporal granularity (i.e., several data points per area per hour)
[33], spatio-temporal density data might enable on-the-fly operational optimization
in the manner of:
• reacting to and forecasting traffic-related phenomena including traffic anomaly
detection and re-routing;
• implementing adaptive public transportation timetables also with an increasingly
autonomous vehicle fleet [52];
• scheduling maintenance work adaptively causing the least amount of disturbance
to inhabitants;
• promoting energy efficiency by switching off unneeded electric equipment on-
demand (cell towers, escalators, street lighting);
• location-aware emergency preparedness protocols in case of natural disasters or
terrorist attacks [7].
These lists of application scenarios are not comprehensive. Interestingly, such an
aggregated view on human mobility enables a large set of practical applications.
2 Privacy models
Privacy has a multitude of definitions, and thus different privacy models have been
proposed. In terms of privacy guarantee, we distinguish between syntactic and se-
mantic privacy models. Syntactic models focus on syntactic requirements of the
anonymized data (e.g., each record should appear at least k times in the anonymized
dataset) without any guarantee on what sensitive information the adversary can
exactly learn about individuals. As opposed to this, semantic models1 are con-
cerned with the private information that can be inferred about individuals using the
anonymized data as well as perhaps some prior (or background) knowledge about
them. The commonality of all privacy models is the inherent trade-off between pri-
vacy and utility: guaranteeing any meaningful privacy requires the distortion of the
original dataset which yields imprecise, coarse-grained knowledge even about the
population as a whole. There is no free lunch: perfect privacy with maximally ac-
curate anonymized data is impossible. Each model has different privacy guarantees
and hence provide different accuracy of the (same) data.
1 In our context, semantic privacy is not analogous to semantic security used in cryptography,
where ciphertexts must not leak any information about plaintexts. Anonymized data (”ciphertext”)
should allow partial information leakage about the original data (”plaintext”), otherwise any data
release would be meaningless. Such partial leakage should include the release of useful population
(and not individual specific) characteristics.
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2.1 Syntactic privacy models
One of the most influential privacy model is k-anonymity, which was first introduced
in computer science by [53], albeit the same notion had already existed before in
statistical literature. In general, for location data, k-anonymity guarantees that any
record is indistinguishable with respect to spatial and temporal information from
at least k− 1 other records. Hence, an adversary who knows some attributes of an
individual (such as few visited places) may not be able decide which record belongs
to this person. Now, let us define k-anonymity more formally.
Definition 1 (k-anonymity [53]). Let P= {P1, . . . ,P|P|} be a set of public attributes,
and S = {S1, . . . ,S|S|} be a set of sensitive attributes. A relational table R(P,S) sat-
isfies k-anonymity iff, for each record in r in R, there are at least k−1 other records
in R which have the same public attribute values as r.
k-anonymity requires (syntactic) indistinguishability of every record in the
dataset from at least k−1 other records with respect to their public attributes. Orig-
inally, public attributes included all (quasi)-identifiers of an individual (such as sex,
ZIP code, birth date) which are easily learnable by an adversary, while the sensitive
attribute value (e.g., salary, medical diagnosis, etc.) of any individual should not be
disclosed. Importantly, the values of public attributes are likely to be unique to a per-
son in a population [23], and hence can be used to link multiple records of the same
individual across different datasets, if these datasets share common public attributes.
In the context of location data, where a spatio-temporal point (L, t) corresponds to
a binary attribute whose value is 1 if the individual visited location L at time t and
0 otherwise, such distinction of public and sensitive attributes is usually pointless.
Indeed, the same location can be insensitive to one person while sensitive to another
one (e.g., a hospital may be an insensitive place for a doctor, who works there, and
sensitive for a patient). Therefore, in a location dataset, k-anonymity should require
that each record (trajectory) must be completely identical to at least k− 1 other
trajectories in the same dataset. Syntactically indistinguishable trajectories/records
form a single anonymity group.
k-anonymity can be achieved by generalizing and/or suppressing the location
visits of individuals in the anonymized dataset. Generalization can be performed by
either forming clusters of similar trajectories, where each cluster has at least k tra-
jectories, or by replacing the location and/or time information of trajectories with
a less specific, but semantically consistent, one. For example, cities are represented
by their county, whereas minutes or hours are represented by the time of day (morn-
ing/afternoon/evening/night).
A relaxation of k-anonymity, called km-anonymity, was first proposed in [54].
This model imposes an explicit constraint on the background knowledge of the ad-
versary, and requires k-anonymity with respect to this specific knowledge. For ex-
ample, if the adversary can learn at most m location visits of an individual, then, for
any set of m location visits, there must be at least 0 or k records in the anonymized
dataset which contain this particular set of visits. Formally:
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Definition 2 (km-anonymity [54]). Given a dataset D where each record is subset
of items from a universe U . D is km-anonymous iff for any m items from U there
are 0 or at least k records which contain these items.
In our context, universeU represents all spatio-temporal points, and an individual’s
record has an item from U if the corresponding spatio-temporal is visited by the
individual.
No. Locations
1 {LA}
2 {LA, Seattle}
3 {NYC, Boston}
4 {NYC, Boston}
5 {LA, Seattle, NYC}
6 {LA, Seattle, NYC}
7 {LA, Seattle, NYC, Boston}
(a) Original
No. Locations
1 {West US}
2 {West US}
3 {NYC, Boston}
4 {NYC, Boston}
5 {LA, Seattle, West US}
6 {LA, Seattle, West US}
7 {LA, Seattle, West US}
(b) 2-anonymous
No. Locations
1 {LA}
2 {LA, Seattle}
3 {West US}
4 {West US}
5 {LA, Seattle, West US}
6 {LA, Seattle, West US}
7 {LA, Seattle, West US}
(c) 22-anonymous
Table 1: Examples for k- and km-anonymity, where each row represents a record,
public and sensitive attributes are not distinguished, and temporal information is
omitted for simplicity. 22-anonymity requires fewer generalizations and hence pro-
vides more accurate data at the cost of privacy.
If m equals the maximum number of location visits per record, then km-
anonymity boils down to standard k-anonymity. However, the rationale behind km-
anonymity is that the adversary is usually incapable of learning more than a few
locations visits per individual (e.g., most people publicly reveal only their home
and working places on social media, in which case m = 2 if temporal data is dis-
regarded). Clearly, requiring indistinguishability with respect to only m instead of
all location visits of an individual requires less generalization and/or suppression
thereby providing more accurate anonymized data. This is also illustrated in Table
1.
We must note that many more different syntactic privacy models (e.g., `-diversity
[39], t-closeness [37], (L,K,C)-privacy [42], etc.) have been proposed to mitigate
the deficiencies of k-anonymity. We refer the interested reader to [21] and [56] for
more details on privacy models and their usage. In this chapter, we only consider
syntactic anonymization schemes which rely on k- or km-anonymity.
2.2 Semantic privacy models
Most syntactic privacy models, such as k-anonymity, aim to mitigate only identity
disclosure, when the adversary re-identifies a record in the dataset (i.e., infer the
exact identity of the record owner). Although re-identification is clearly undesirable
and explicitly addressed by most legal regulations worldwide, it is not a necessary
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condition of privacy violations. That is, locating the anonymity group of a person
(e.g., using his home and working places), the group itself can still leak a person’s
visited places no matter how large the group is. For instance, each of the k trajectory
may contain the same sensitive place, which means that the person also passed this
place. The real culprit is the lack of uncertainty about the individuals’ presence in
the anonymized dataset; even a knowledgeable adversary, who may know that a per-
son’s record is part of the original dataset, should not be able learn if this record was
indeed used to generate the anonymized data. Another common pitfall of syntac-
tic privacy models is the lack of composability; the privacy of independent releases
of the same or correlated datasets should not collapse but rather “degrade grace-
fully”. However, this does not hold for k-anonymity: the composition of k-anonym
datasets, where k can be arbitrarily large, can only be 1-anonym (i.e., the anonymity
guarantee completely collapses), which is also demonstrated in [22]. Composability
is a natural requirement of any privacy model in the era of Big Data where many
different pieces of personal data get anonymized and published about people by
many different stakeholders independently. These different pieces may be gathered
and combined by a knowledgeable adversary in order to breach individuals’ privacy.
Next, we present a model which addresses these concerns.
Intuitively, differential privacy [15] requires that the outcome of any computation
be insensitive to the change of any single record inside and outside the dataset.
It allows a party to privately release a dataset: with perturbation mechanisms, a
function of an input dataset is modified, prior to its release, so that any information
which can discriminate a record from the rest of the dataset is bounded [16].
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy [16]). A privacy mechanism A guarantees
(ε,δ )-differential privacy if for any database D and D′, differing on at most one
record, and for any possible output S⊆ Range(A ),
Pr[A (D) ∈ S]≤ eε ×Pr[A (D′) ∈ S]+δ
or, equivalently, PrO∼A (D)
[
log
(
Pr[A (D)=O]
Pr[A (D′)=O]
)
> ε
]
≤ δ .
Here, ε is typically a modest value (i.e., less than 1), and δ is a negligible function
of the number of records in D (i.e., less then 1/|D|) [16].
We highlight two consequences of the above definition which are often over-
looked or misinterpreted. First, differential privacy guarantees plausible deniability
to every individual inside as well as outside of the dataset, as an adversary, provided
with the output ofA , can draw almost the same conclusions about any individual no
matter if this individual is included in the input of A or not [16]. Specifically, Defi-
nition 3 guarantees that every output of algorithm A is almost equally likely (up to
ε) on datasets differing in a single record except with probability at most δ . This im-
plies that every possible binary inference (i.e., predicate) has almost the same prob-
ability to be true (false) on neighboring datasets [15]. For example, if an adversary
can infer from A (D) that an individual, say John, visited a hospital with probabil-
ity 0.95, where D excludes John’s record, then the same adversary infers the same
from A (D′) with probability ≈ e±ε × 0.95+ δ , where D′ = D∪{John’s record}.
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This holds for any adversary and inference irrespective of the applied inference al-
gorithm and prior (background) knowledge2. That is, the privacy measure ε and δ
are “agnostic” to the adversarial background knowledge and inference algorithm.
Second, Definition 3 does not provide any guarantee about the (in)accuracy of
any inference. There can be inferences (adversaries) which may predict the hospi-
tal visit of John quite accurately, e.g., by noticing that all records, which are very
similar to John’s record (such as the records having the same age and profession
as John), also visited a hospital [11], while other inferences may do a bad job of
prediction as they cannot reliably sort out the records being similar (correlated) to
John’s record. Definition 3 guarantees that the accuracy of any inferences, no matter
how sensitive are, remain unchanged (up to ε and δ ) if John’s own record is in-
cluded in the anonymized data. In other words, differential privacy allows to learn
larger statistical trends in the dataset, even if these trends reveal perhaps sensitive
information about each individual, and protects secrets about individuals which can
only be revealed with their participation in the dataset3. Learning such trends (i.e.,
inferences which are generalizable to a larger population in interest) is the ultimate
goal of any data release in general.
Therefore, the advantage of differential privacy, compared to the many other
models proposed in the literature, is two-fold. First, it provides a formal and mea-
surable privacy guarantee regardless what other background information or sophis-
ticated inference technique the adversary uses even in the future. Second, following
from Definition 3, it is closed with respect to sequential and parallel composition,
i.e., the result of the sequential or parallel combination of two differential private
algorithms is also differential private.
Theorem 1 ([40]). If each of A1, . . . ,Ak is (ε,δ )-differential private, then their k-
fold adaptive composition4 is (kε,kδ )-differential private.
Composition property has particular importance in practice, since it does not
only simplify the design of anonymization (sanitization) solutions, but also allows
to measure differential privacy when a given dataset, or a set of correlated datasets,
is anonymized (and released) several times, possibly by different entities.
There are a few ways to achieve DP and all of them are based on the randomiza-
tion of a computation whose result ought to be released. Most of these techniques are
composed of adding noise to the true output with zero mean and variance calibrated
to desired privacy guarantee which is measured by ε and δ . A fundamental con-
cept of these techniques is the global sensitivity of the computation (function) [16]
whose result should be released:
2 The inference algorithm and background knowledge influences only the probability of the con-
clusion, which is 0.95 in the current example
3 These secrets are the private information which discriminate the individual from the rest of the
dataset and should be protected
4 Adaptive composition means that the output of Ai−1 is used as an input of Ai, that is, their
executions are not necessarily independent except their coin tosses.
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Definition 4 (Global Lp-sensitivity). For any function f : D → Rd , the Lp-
sensitivity of f is ∆p f =maxD,D′ || f (D)− f (D′)||p, for all D,D′ differing in at most
one record, where || · ||p denotes the Lp-norm.
The Gaussian Mechanism [16] consists of adding Gaussian noise to the true
output of a function. In particular, for any function f : D → Rd , the mecha-
nism is defined as G (D) = f (D) + 〈N1(0,σ), . . . ,Nd(0,σ)〉, where Ni(0,σ) are
i.i.d. normal random variables with zero mean and with probability density func-
tion g(z|σ) = 1√
2piσ2
e−z2/2σ2 . The variance σ2 is calibrated to the L2-sensitivity of
f which is shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ([16]). For any function f :D → Rd , the mechanism A
A (D) = f (D)+ 〈G1(σ), . . . ,Gd(σ)〉
gives (ε,δ )-differential privacy for any ε < 1 and σ2 ≥ 2(∆2 f )2 ln(1.25/δ )/ε2,
where Gi(σ) are i.i.d Gaussian variables with variance σ2.
For example, if there are d possible locations and f returns the number of vis-
its per location (i.e., the spatial density), then ∆1 f equals the maximum number of
all visits of any single individual in any input dataset, where ∆2 f ≤ ∆1 f . If ∆2 f is
“too” large or ε and/or δ are “too” small, large noise is added providing less accu-
rate visit counts. Also notice that the noise variance is calibrated to the worst-case
contribution of any single individual to the output of f , which means that the count
of popular locations visited by many individuals can be more accurately released
than less popular locations with smaller counts. Indeed, all location counts are per-
turbed with the same magnitude of noise, hence the signal-to-noise ratio is higher
for larger counts providing smaller relative error.
3 Releasing spatio-temporal data
Suppose a geographical region which is composed of a set L of locations visited
by N individuals over a time of interest with T discretized epochs5. These locations
may represent a partitioning of the region (e.g., all districts of the metropolitan area
of a city). The mobility dataset D of N users is a binary data cube with size N · |L| ·T ,
where Di,L,t = 1 if individual i visited location L in epoch t otherwise Di,L,t = 0. That
is, each individual’s record (or trajectory) is represented by a binary vector with
size |L|×T . The spatio-temporal density of locations L is defined by the number of
individuals who visited these locations as a function of time. More precisely, there is
a time series XL = 〈XL0 ,XL1 , . . . ,XLT−1〉 for any location L∈L, where XLt =∑Ni=1 Di,L,t
and 0≤ t < T . XL denotes the set of time series of all locations L and is referred to
as the spatio-temporal density of locations L in the sequel.
5 An epoch can be any time interval such as a second, a minute, an hour, etc.
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In general, any data release is modelled by the execution of data queries. For
example, if the querier is interested in the spatio-temporal density of locations
SL ⊆ L at time ST ⊆ {0,1, . . . ,T − 1}, then the query Q(SL,ST ) is computed as
Q(SL,ST ) = ∑L∈SL,t∈ST ∑
N
i=1 Di,L,t = ∑L∈SL,t∈ST X
L
t . This gives rise to at least three
approaches for the privacy-preserving release of spatio-temporal density:
Approach 1: compute any query Q on the original data D (or XL) and release only
the anonymized query result Qˆ(SL,ST );
Approach 2: anonymize the mobility dataset D into Dˆ, then release Dˆ which can
be used to answer any query Q as Qˆ(SL,ST ) = ∑L∈SL,t∈ST ∑
N
i=1 Dˆi,L,t ;
Approach 3: compute the density XL from the original mobility data D as XLt =
∑Ni=1 Di,L,t , and release the anonymized XˆL, where XˆL can be used to answer any
query Q.
In Approach 1, a querier can adaptively (i.e., interactively) choose its queries de-
pending on the result of previously answered queries. By contrast, in Approach 2
and 3, the released data are used to answer arbitrary number and type of queries
non-interactively (i.e., the queries are independent of each other). In fact, Approach
1, 2 and 3 only differ in their adversary models: Approach 2 and 3 are instantia-
tions of Approach 1 in the non-interactive setting where the possibly adversarial
querier must fix all queries before learning any of its results. Specifically, Approach
2 is simply consists of answering N · |L| ·T binary queries at once, where a query
returns an element of the cube D. Similarly, in Approach 2, |L ·T | queries can rep-
resent the elements of every time series, where all queries are answered together. As
detailed in the sequel, the decreased number of queries as well as the non-interactive
answering mechanism is the reason that Approach 3 usually outperforms Approach
1 and 2 in practice as long as the only goal is to release XL as accurately as possible
meanwhile preserving the privacy of individuals. Hence, we will detail a specific
solution of Approach 3 in Section 3.3 and briefly review the rest in Section 3.1 and
3.2.
3.1 Approach 1: Anonymization of specific query results
3.1.1 Syntactic anonymization
Privacy breaches may be alleviated by query auditing which requires to main-
tain all released queries. The database receives a set of counting queries
Q1(SL1 ,ST1), . . . ,Qn(SLn ,STn), and the auditor needs to decide whether the queries
can be answered without revealing any single visit or not. Specifically, the goal is
to prevent the full disclosure of any single visit of any spatio-temporal point in the
dataset.
Definition 5 (Full disclosure). Di,L,t is fully disclosed by a query set
{Q1(SL1 ,ST1), . . . ,Qn(SLn ,STn)} if Di,L,t can be uniquely determined, i.e., in all pos-
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sible data sets D consistent with the answers c = (c1, . . . ,cn) to queries Q1, . . . ,Qn,
Di,L,t is the same.
As each query corresponds to a linear equation on location visits, the auditor can
check whether any location visit can be uniquely determined by solving a system of
linear equations specified by the queries. To ease notation, let x = (x1, . . . ,xN·|L|·T )
denote the set of all location visits, i.e., there is a bijection α : [1,N]×L× [1,T ]→
[1,N · |L| · T ] such that xα(i,L,t) = Di,L,t . Let Q be a matrix with n rows and N ·
|L| ·T columns. Each row in Q corresponds to a query, which is represented by a
binary vector, indexing the visits that are covered by the query. The system of linear
equations is described in matrix form as Qx = c. Hence, the auditor checks whether
any xi can be uniquely determined by solving the following system of equations:
Qx = c
subject to xi ∈ {0,1} for 1≤ i≤ N · |L| ·T
(1)
In general, this problem is coNP-hard as the variables xi have boolean values [34].
However, there exists an efficient polynomial time algorithm in the special case
when the queries are 1-dimensional, i.e. there is a permutation of x where each query
covers a subsequence of the permutation. Typical examples include range queries.
For instance, if locations are ordered according to their coordinates on a space-filling
Hilbert curve, then range queries can ask for the total number of visits of locations
(over all epochs) that are geographically also close. In the case of 1-dimensional
queries, the auditor has to determine the integer solutions of the following system
of equations and inequalities:
Qx′ = c
subject to 0≤ x′i ≤ 1 for 1≤ i≤ N · |L| ·T
(2)
Notice that the variables in Eq. (2) are no longer over boolean data and hence Eq. (2)
can be solved in polynomial time with any LP solver [55]. The integer solutions of
Eq. (2) equals the solutions of Eq. (1) for 1-dimensional location queries [34].
In the general case, when the queries are multi-dimensional, the auditor can also
solve Eq. (2), and the final solutions are obtained by rounding: xˆi = 1 if x′i > 1/2 and
xˆi = 0 otherwise. In that case, xˆ ≈ x for sufficiently large number of queries [14].
In particular, if each query covers a visit with probability 1/2, then O(|x| log2 |x|)
queries are sufficient to recover almost the whole x (i.e., dataset D). Even more, only
|x| number of deterministically chosen queries are enough to recover almost the
entire original data [17]. In fact, these reconstruction techniques are the best known
attacks against a database curator who answers only aggregate counting queries over
boolean data.
Therefore, equipped with the original data x, the auditor can check whether any
of the above attacks would be successful by comparing x with the reconstructed
values xˆ (or x′). If so, the auditor refuses to answer any of the n queries.
The above query auditing techniques have several problems. First and foremost,
refusing to answer a query itself can leak information about the underlying dataset
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(i.e., D) [44]. This would not be the case if refusal was independent of the under-
lying dataset (e.g., auditing is carried out without accessing the true answers c).
Second, they can be computationally expensive. Indeed, using the solver in [55] the
worst-case running time is O(n|x|4) if |x| n. Finally, most query auditing schemes
assume that the adversary has either no background knowledge about the data, or
it is known to the auditor. These are impractical assumptions which is also demon-
strated in Section 1.1.1, where the adversary reconstructed complete trajectories
from aggregate location counts exploiting some inherent characteristics of human
mobility.
3.1.2 Semantic anonymization
An alternative approach to query auditing perturbs each query result with some
random noise and releases these noisy answers. In order to guarantee (ε,δ )-
differential privacy, the added noise usually follows a Laplace or Gaussian distri-
bution. If the noise is added independently to each query answer, then the error is
O(
√
n log(1/δ )/εN) [16], where N is the number of individuals and n is the num-
ber of queries. This follows from the advanced composition property of differential
privacy [16]. Therefore, Ω˜(N2) queries can be answered using this approach with
non-trivial error (i.e., it is less than the magnitude of the answer). We note that at
least Ω(
√
N) noise is needed per query in order to guarantee any reasonable notion
of privacy [14, 16]. There also exist better techniques that add correlated noise to the
answers. For instance, the private multiplicative weight mechanism [26] can answer
exponentially many queries in N with non-trivial error, where the added noise scales
with O(
√
log(T |L|) · log(1/δ ) · log(n)/εN)1/2.
In contrast to query auditing described in Section 3.1, the above mechanisms can
answer queries in an on-line fashion (i.e., each query is answered as it arrives) and
run in time poly(N,T |L|) per query. Moreover, the privacy guarantee is indepen-
dent of the adversarial background knowledge (see Section 2.2). On the other hand,
they distort (falsify) the data by perturbation, which may not be desirable in some
practical applications of spatio-temporal density. Another drawback is that they are
data agnostic and may not exploit some inherent correlation between query results
which are due to the nature of the location data. For example, query results usually
follow a publicly known periodic trend, and adding noise in the frequency domain
can provide more accurate answers [5].
3.2 Approach 2: Anonymization of the mobility dataset
3.2.1 Syntactic anonymization
In general, anonymizing location trajectories (i.e., the whole cube D) while preserv-
ing practically acceptable utility is challenging. This is due to the fact that loca-
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tion data is typically high-dimensional and sparse, that is, any individual can visit a
large number of different locations, but most of them typically visit only a few loca-
tions which are quite different per user. This has devastating effect on the utility of
anonymized datasets: most k-anonymization schemes generalize multiple trajecto-
ries into a single group (or cluster) and represent each trajectory with the centroid of
their cluster [2, 43, 47]. Hence, every record becomes (syntactically) indistinguish-
able from other records within its cluster. This generalization is often implemented
by some sophisticated clustering algorithm, where the most similar trajectories are
grouped together with an additional (privacy) constraint: each cluster must contain
at least k trajectories. Unfortunately, such approaches fail to provide sufficiently
useful anonymized datasets because of the curse of dimensionality [6]: any trajec-
tory exhibits almost identical similarity to any other trajectory in the dataset. This
implies that the centroid of each cluster tend to be very dissimilar from the cluster
members implying weak utility. Moreover, as the distribution of the number of visits
of spatio-temporal points are typically heavy-tailed [45], projection to low dimen-
sions and then clustering in low dimension also loses almost all information about
the trajectories. This is illustrated by Figure 1 which shows the result of a state-
of-the-art anonymization scheme, referred to as Never-Walk-Alone (NWA) [2], on
a synthetic dataset with 1000 trajectories6. This scheme groups k co-localized tra-
jectories within the same time period to form a k-anonymized aggregate trajectory,
where k was set to 3 in our experiment and the greatest difference between any spa-
tial point of two members of the same cluster is set to 2000 meters. Figure 1 shows
that even with modest values of k, the anonymized dataset provides quite imprecise
spatial density of the city.
To improve utility while relaxing privacy requirements, km-anonymity has
also been considered to anonymize location trajectories in [48]. However, most
anonymization solutions guaranteeing km-anonymity has a computational cost
which is exponential in m in the worst-case, hence this approach is only feasible
if m is small. This drawback is alleviated in [3], where a probabilistic relaxation
of km-anonymity is proposed to release the location visits of individuals without
temporal information. In theory, temporal data can also be released along with the
location information if the m items are composed of pairs of spatial and temporal
positions. However, care must be taken as the background knowledge of a realistic
adversary cannot always be represented by m items (e.g., it perhaps also knows the
frequency of m items of a targeted individual).
Another approach improving on k-anonymization is p-confidentiality [10]; in-
stead of grouping the trajectories, the underlying map is anonymized, i.e., points of
interest are grouped together creating obfuscation areas around sensitive locations.
More precisely, given the path of a trajectory, p bounds the probability that the tra-
jectory stops at a sensitive node in any group. Supposing that (i) the background
knowledge of the adversary consists of stopping probabilities for each location in a
single path and (ii) sensitive locations are pre-specified by data owners, groups of
locations are formed in such a way that the parts of trajectories entering the groups
6 We used a subset of a larger synthetic trajectory dataset available on https://iapg.
jade-hs.de/personen/brinkhoff/generator/
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Fig. 1: Never-Walk-Alone anonymization. Original dataset (city of Oldenburg in
Germany) with 1000 trajectories (left) and its anonymized version (NWA from [2])
with k= 3 where the distance between any points of two trajectories within the same
cluster is at most 2000 meters (right). (Image courtesy of Ga´bor Gyo¨rgy Gulya´s.)
do not increase the adversary’s belief in violating the p-confidentiality. Trajectories
are then anonymized based on the above map anonymization. The efficiency and
utility of this solution is promising, however, in cases where the adversarial back-
ground knowledge cannot be approximated well (or at all), semantic privacy models
such as differential privacy is preferred.
3.2.2 Semantic anonymization
A more promising approach is to publish a synthetic (anonymized) mobility dataset
resembling the original dataset as much as possible, while achieving provable guar-
antees w.r.t. the privacy of each individual. The records in both datasets follow sim-
ilar underlying distributions, i.e., after modeling the generator distribution of the
original dataset, random samples (records) are drawn from a noisy version of this
distribution. A few solutions exist in literature where the generator distribution is
modeled explicitly and noised to guarantee differential privacy. For example, DP-
WHERE [41] adds noise to the set of empirical probability distributions which is
derived from CDR (Call-Detail-Record) datasets, and samples from these distri-
butions to generate synthetic CDRs which are differential private. Although this
synthetic dataset can also be used to compute spatio-temporal density, it is usually
not as accurate as perturbing the generator distribution of the spatio-temporal den-
sity exclusively [4]. Indeed, the accurate model of more complex data (such as the
original mobility data) is also more complex in general (i.e., have larger number of
parameters), which usually requires increased perturbation.
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Some other works generate synthetic sequential data using more general data
generating models such as different Markov models [9, 8, 29]. These approaches
have wide applicability but they are usually not as accurate as a specific model
tailored to the publicly known characteristics of the dataset to be anonymized. We
illustrate this important point by the following example. DP-WHERE is designed
for CDR datasets, and provides more accurate anonymized CDR data than a simple
n-gram model [8]. For example, DP-WHERE models the distribution of commute
distances per home location and then generates a pair of home and working places
as follows. First, a home location is selected, which is followed by picking a dis-
tance from the (noisy) distribution of commute distances. Finally, a working place
is selected which has this distance from the selected home location. This approach
results in more accurate representation of home and working places than using the
noisy occurrence counts of different pairs of home and working places like in [8].
This is because commute distances are modeled by an exponential distribution [41],
and its single rate parameter can be estimated by the median of the empirical data
(i.e., commute distances). Therefore, in DP-WHERE, the probability of a particular
pair of home and working location depends on their distance, while in an n-gram
model, it depends on the occurrence count of this pair in the original dataset. For
instance, New York, as a home location, occurs equally likely with LA and Philadel-
phia, as working places, in an n-gram model, if these pairs have the same frequency
in the original dataset. By contrast, in DP-WHERE, New York is much more likely
to co-occur with the geographically closer Philadelphia than with LA. The moral
of the story is that achieving the best performance requires to find the most faithful
model of the data whose accuracy does not degrade significantly due to additional
perturbation.
3.3 Approach 3: Anonymization of spatio-temporal density
A simple k-anonymization of time series XL releases XLt only if XLt ≥ k. However,
as it is detailed in Section 1, this still allows privacy violations through various re-
construction attacks. Hence, releasing spatio-temporal density with provable privacy
guarantees, such as differential privacy, is preferred in many practical scenarios.
Within the literature of differential privacy, a plethora of techniques have been
proposed to release 1- and 2-dimensional range queries (or histograms) while pre-
serving differential privacy [59, 28, 49, 35, 38, 60, 12, 36, 5, 64, 62, 26] and they
are also systematically compared in [27]. Indeed, interpreting query results (or bin
counts in a histogram) as location counts, these techniques are directly applicable
to release spatial density without temporal data. In theory, low-dimensional embed-
ding, such as Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) [50], may allow to use any of the
above techniques to release spatio-temporal density.
Another line of research addresses the release of time series data with the guaran-
tees of differential privacy. This is challenging as time series are large dimensional
data whose global sensitivity is usually so large that the magnitude of the added
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noise is greater than the actual counts of the series for stringent privacy require-
ment (i.e., ε < 1 and δ ≤ 1/|N| where N is the number of records). Consequently,
naively adding noise to each count of a time series often results in useless data. Sev-
eral more sophisticated techniques [51, 31, 19] have been proposed to release time
series data meanwhile guaranteeing differential privacy. Most of these methods re-
duce the global sensitivity of the time series by using standard lossy compression
techniques borrowed from signal processing such as sampling, low-pass filtering,
Kalman filtering, and smoothing via averaging. The main idea that the utility degra-
dation is decomposed into a reconstruction error, which is due to lossy compression,
and a perturbation error, which is due to the injected Laplace or Gaussian noise to
guarantee differential privacy. Although strongly compressed data is less accurate,
it also requires less noise to be added to guarantee privacy. The goal is to find a good
balance between compression and perturbation to minimize the total error.
There are only a few existing papers addressing the release of spatio-temporal
density specifically. Although data sources (and hence the definition of spatio-
temporal density) vary to a degree in these papers, the commonality is the usage
of domain-specific knowledge, i.e., the correlation of data points at hand in both the
spatial and the temporal dimension. This domain-specific knowledge helps over-
come several challenges including high perturbation error, data sparsity in the spa-
tial domain, and (in some of the cases) real-time data publication. In the context
of releasing multi-location traffic aggregates, road network and density are utilized
to model the auto-correlation of individual regions over time as well as correlation
between neighboring regions [20]. Temporal estimation establishes an internal time
series model for each individual cell and performs posterior estimation to improve
the utility of the shared traffic aggregate per time stamp. Spatial estimation builds
a spatial indexing structure to group similar cells together reducing the impact of
data sparsity. All computations are lightweight enabling real-time data publishing.
Drawing on the notion of w-event privacy [32], RescueDP studies the problem of the
real-time release of population statistics per regions [57]. Such w-event privacy pro-
tects each user’s mobility trace over any successive w time stamp inside the infinite
data grouping algorithm that dynamically aggregates sparse regions together. The
criterion for regions to be grouped is that local population statistics should follow
a similar trend. Finally, a practical scheme for releasing the spatio-temporal density
of a large municipality based on a large CDR dataset is introduced in [4]. Owing to
the complexity of its scenario and the innovative techniques used, we present this
work in detail in Section 4.
4 A Case-study: Anonymizing the spatio-temporal density of
Paris
In this section, we present an anonymization (or sanitization) technique in order to
release the spatio-temporal density with provable privacy guarantees. Several opti-
mizations are applied to boost accuracy: time series are compressed by sampling,
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clustering and low-pass filtering. The distortion of the perturbation is attenuated
via further optimization and post-processing algorithms. A striking demonstration
shows that the achieved performance is high and can be practical in real-world appli-
cations: the spatio-temporal density of the city of Paris in France, covering roughly
2 million people over 105 km2, is anonymized using the proposed approach.
The specific goal is to release the spatio-temporal density of 989 non-overlapping
areas in Paris, called IRIS cells. Each cell is defined by INSEE7 and covers about
2000 inhabitants. L denotes the set of all IRIS cells henceforth, and are depicted in
Figure 2 based on their contours8. We aim to release the number of all individuals
who visited a specific IRIS cell in each hour over a whole week. Since human mo-
bility trajectories exhibit a high degree of temporal and spatial regularity [24], one
week long period should be sufficient for most practical applications. Therefore,
we are interested in the time series XL = 〈XL0 ,XL1 , . . . ,XL167〉 of any IRIS cell L ∈ L,
where XLt denotes the number of individuals at L in the (t +1)th hour of the week,
such that any single individual can visit a tower only once in an hour. We will omit
t and L in the sequel, if they are unambiguous in the given context. XL denotes the
set of time series of all IRIS cells in the sequel.
To compute XL, we use a CDR (Call Detail Record) dataset provided by a large
telecom company. This CDR data contains the list of events of each subscriber (user)
of the operator, where an event is composed of the location (GPS coordinate of the
cell tower), along with a timestamp, where an incoming/outgoing call or message
is sent to/from the individual. The dataset contains the events of N = 1,992,846
users at 1303 towers within the administrative region of Paris (i.e., the union of
all IRIS cells) over a single week (10/09/2007 - 17/09/2007). Within this interval,
the average number of events per user is 13.55 with a standard deviation of 18.33
(assuming that an individual can visit any tower cell only once in an hour) and with
a maximum at 732. Similarly to IRIS cells, we can create another set of time series
XC, where XCt denotes the number of visits of tower C in the (t + 1)th hour of the
week.
To map the counts in XC to XL, we compute the Voronoi tessellation of the
towers cells C which is shown in Figure 2. Then, we calculate the count of each
IRIS cell in each hour from the counts of its overlapping tower cells; each tower cell
contributes with a count which is proportional to the size of the overlapping area.
More specifically, if an IRIS cell L overlaps with tower cells {C1,C2, . . . ,Cc}, then
XLt =
c
∑
i=1
XCit ×
size(Ci∩L)
size(Ci)
(3)
at time t.
The rationale behind this mapping is that users are usually registered at the ge-
ographically closest tower at any time. Notice that this mapping technique might
7 National Institute of Statistics and Economics: http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/
default.asp?page=zonages/iris.htm
8 Available on IGN’s website (National Geographic Institute): http://professionnels.
ign.fr/contoursiris
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Fig. 2: IRIS cells of Paris (left) and Voronoi-tesselation of tower cells (right)
Algorithm 1 Anonymization scheme
Input: XT - input time series (from CDR), (ε , δ )-privacy parameters, L - IRIS cells, ` - maximum
visits per user
Output: Noisy time series XˆL
1: Create XC by sampling at most ` visits per user from XC
2: Compute the IRIS time series XL from XC using Eq, (3)
3: Perturb XL into XˆL //see Algorithm 2
4: Apply smoothing on XˆL
sometimes be incorrect, since the real association of users and towers depends on
several other factors such as signal strength or load-balancing. Nevertheless, with-
out more details of the cellular network beyond the towers’ GPS position, there is
not any better mapping technique.
4.1 Outline of the anonymization process
The aim is to transform the time series of all IRIS cells XL to a sanitized version XˆL
such that XˆL satisfies Definition 3. That is, the distribution of XˆL will be insensitive
(up to ε and δ ) to all the visits of any single user during the whole week, meanwhile
the error between XˆL and XL is small.
The anonymization algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 1. First, the input dataset
is pre-sampled such that only ` visits are retained per user (Line 1). This ensures
that the global L1-sensitivity of all the time series (i.e., XL) is no more than `. Then,
the pre-sampled time series of each IRIS cell is computed from that of the tower
cells using Voronoi-tesselation (Line 2), which is followed by the perturbation of
the time series of all IRIS cells to guarantee privacy (Line 3). In order to mitigate
the distortion of the previous steps, smoothing is applied on the perturbed time series
as a post-processing step (Line 4).
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4.2 Pre-sampling
To perturb the time series of all IRIS cells, we first compute their sensitivity, i.e.,
∆1(XL). To this end, we first need to calculate the sensitivity of the time series of all
tower cells, i.e., ∆1(XC). Indeed, Eq. (3) does not change the L1-sensitivity of tower
counts, and hence, ∆1(XC) = ∆1(XL).
∆1(XC) is given by the maximum total number of (tower) visits of a single user
in any input dataset. This upper bound must universally hold for all possible in-
put datasets, and is usually on the order of few hundreds; recall that the maximum
number of visits per user is 732 in our dataset. This would require excessive noise
to be added in the perturbation phase. Instead, each record of any input dataset is
truncated by considering at most one visit per hour for each user, and then at most `
of such visits are selected per user uniformly at random over the whole week. This
implies that a user can contribute with at most ` to all the counts in total regardless
of the input dataset, and hence, the L1-sensitivity of the dataset always becomes `.
The pre-sampled dataset is denoted by X, and ∆1(X
C
) = ∆1(X
L
) = `.
In order to compute the L2-sensitivity ∆2(XL), observe that, for any t, there is
only a single tower whose count can change (by at most 1) by modifying a single
user’s data. From Eq. (3), it follows that the total change of all IRIS cell counts is
at most 1 at any t, and hence ∆2(X
L
) ≤ ∆2(XC) =
√
` based on the definition of
L2-norm.
4.3 Perturbation
The time series XL can be perturbed by adding G (
√
2` ln(1.25/δ )/ε) to each count
in all time series (see Theorem 2) in order to guarantee (ε,δ )-DP. Unfortunately,
this naive method provides very poor results as individual cells have much smaller
counts than the magnitude of the injected noise; the standard deviation of the Gaus-
sian noise is 95 with ε = 0.3 and δ = 2 · 10−6, which is comparable to the mean
count in XL.
A better approach exploits (1) the similarity of geographically close time series,
as well as (2) their periodic nature. In particular, nearby less populated cells are first
clustered until their aggregated counts become sufficiently large to resist noise. The
key observation is that the time series of close cells follow very similar trends, but
their counts usually have different magnitudes. Hence, if we simply aggregate (i.e.,
sum up) all time series within such a cluster, the aggregated series will have a trend
close to its individual components yet large enough counts to tolerate perturbation.
To this end, the time series of individual cells are first accurately approximated by
normalizing their aggregated time series (i.e., the aggregated count of each hour is
divided with the total number of visits inside the cluster), and then scaled back with
the (noisy) total number of visits of individual cells.
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Algorithm 2 Perturbation
Input: Pre-sampled time series XL, Privacy budget ε , δ , Sensitivity ∆1(X
L
) = `
Output: Noisy time series XˆL
1: Sˆi := ∑167t=0 X
i
t +G (2
√
2` ln(2.5/δ )/ε) for each i ∈ L
2: E := Cluster(L, Sˆ)
3: for each cluster E ∈ E do
4: XE := 〈∑i∈E X i0,∑i∈E X i1, . . . ,∑i∈E X i167〉
5: XˆE := FourierPerturb(XE ,ε/2,δ )
6: for each cell i ∈ E do
7: Xˆi := Sˆi · (XˆEt /||XˆE ||1)
8: end for
9: end for
In order to guarantee differential privacy (DP), the aggregated time series are
perturbed before normalization. To do so, their periodic nature is exploited and
a Fourier-based perturbation scheme [51, 5] is applied: Gaussian noise is added
to the Fourier coefficients of the aggregated time series, and all high-frequency
components are removed that would be suppressed by the noise. Specifically, the
low-frequency components (i.e., largest Fourier coefficients) are retained and per-
turbed with noise G (
√
2` ln(1.25/δ )/ε), while the high-frequency components are
removed and padded with 0. As only (the noisy) low-frequency components are re-
tained, this method preserves the main trends of the original data more faithfully
than simply adding Gaussian noise to XL, while guaranteeing the same (ε/2,δ/2-
DP. Further details of this technique can be found in [4].
The whole perturbation process is summarized in Algorithm 2. First, the
noisy total number of visits of each cell in L is computed by adding noise
G (2
√
2` ln(2.5/δ )/ε) to ∑167t=0 X
i
t for cell i (Line 1). These noisy total counts are
used to cluster similar cells in Line 2 by invoking any clustering algorithm aiming
to create clusters with large aggregated counts overall (i.e., the sum of all cells’ time
series within the cluster has large counts) using only the noisy total number of visits
Sˆi as input. The output E of this clustering algorithm is a partitioning of cells L.
When clusters E are created, their aggregated time series (i.e., the sum of all cells’
time series within the cluster) is perturbed with a Fourier-based perturbation scheme
[5] in Line 5. Finally, the perturbed time series of each cell i in L is computed in
Line 7 by scaling back the normalized aggregated time series with the noisy total
count cell i (i.e., with Sˆi). Since Line 1 guarantees (ε/2,δ/2)-DP to the total counts
(∆1(X
L
) =
√
`), it follows from Theorem 1 that Algorithm 2 is (ε , δ )-DP as the
Fourier perturbation of time-series is (ε/2,δ/2)-DP in Line 5 [4].
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Fig. 3: Algorithm 1 before improvements (ε = 0.3, δ = 2 ·10−6, `= 30).
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(b) Smoothing
Fig. 4: Algorithm 1 after improvements (ε = 0.3,δ = 2 ·10−6, `= 30)
4.4 Improvements: Scaling and Smoothing
The result of the above perturbation technique, which is illustrated in Figure 3, still
suggests a large error on average. The difference between Xˆ and X is the result
of two errors: the sampling error (between X and X) is attributed to pre-sampling,
whereas the perturbation error (between Xˆ and X) is due to the perturbation scheme
presented in Algorithm 2. Indeed, since Xi is the pre-sampled time series of cell i,
Xˆi (Line 6 of Algorithm 2) will be a scaled down version of the original time series
Xi due to the fact that the ` visits per individual are sampled uniformly at random.
As illustrated by Figure 3a, sampling error mainly distorts large counts: although
the noisy counts are close to the counts of the truncated (pre-sampled) time series
between 9:00 AM and 11:00 PM, it is still far from the original count values. This
significantly increases the mean relative error. In addition, as Figure 3b also shows,
noisy counts also deviate from pre-sampled as well as from original counts around
the local minimas (close to 4:00 AM every day), which further deteriorates the rel-
ative error.
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To alleviate these errors, two further improvements are proposed in [4]: first, the
perturbation of total cell counts (Line 1 in Algorithm 2) is improved, which is used in
cell clustering (Line 2 in Algorithm 2) and scaling (Line 6 in Algorithm 2). The main
idea is that the real scaling factor∑167t=0 X it (in Line 1 of Algorithm 2) is approximated
by a more accurate technique: the relative frequency of each tower is first estimated
by sampling only a single visit per user, then the perturbed relative frequencies are
multiplied with the (perturbed) total number of visits of the original data X to obtain
an estimation of ∑167t=0 X it . The relative frequencies have L2-sensitivity 1, while the
L2-sensitivity of the total number of visits is
√
753< 27.44. Hence, the relative error
of this new estimation becomes small, as the relative frequencies of towers require
very small noise, while the total number of visits is incomparably larger than its L2-
sensitivity. Finally, in order to diminish perturbation error of small counts, counts
between 0:00 and 6:00 AM are smoothed out through non-linear least-square fitting
as a post-processing step.
4.5 Time complexity
The pre-sampling step has a complexity of O(`N) and the computation of XL (see
Eq. (3)) needs O(T |C||L|) steps in the worst case. In the perturbation algorithm
(Alg. 2), the clustering of time-series runs in O(T |L|2) and the Discrete Cosine
Transform can be implemented with Fast Fourier Transform that has a complexity of
O(T logT ). Therefore, the overall complexity is O(|L|T logT +T |L|2 +T |C||L|+
`N) disregarding the post-processing step (in Line 4 of Algorithm 1).
4.6 Results
The error between the anonymized and original time series is measured by two
metrics: the mean relative error (MRE) and the Pearson Correlation (PC), where
MRE(X, Xˆ) = (1/n)∑n−1i=0
|Xˆi−Xi|
max(γ,Xi)
9. The Pearson correlation measures the linear
correlation between the noisy and the original time series (i.e., whether they have
similar trends), and it always falls between −1 and 1.
The MRE and PC of individual IRIS cells are illustrated by color maps
in Figure 5. This figure shows that the presented anonymization (Figure 5b)
scheme outperforms the naive Gaussian Perturbation Algorithm (Figure 5a) when
G (
√
2` ln(1.25/δ )/ε) is added to each count in XL without any further optimiza-
tion. Moreover, Algorithm 1 can also provide practical utility for most cells with
strong privacy guarantee. Specifically, the average MRE over all cells is only 0.17
with ε = 0.3, δ = 2 ·10−6 and `= 30.
9 The sanity bound γ mitigates the effect of very small counts and is adjusted to 0.1% of ∑n−1i=0 Xi
[58]
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(a) Naive Gaussian Perturbation (Avg. MRE: 1.01, PC: 0.47)
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Fig. 5: Mean Relative Error and Pearson Correlation of each IRIS cell (ε = 0.3,
δ = 2 ·10−6, `= 30)
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we gave an overview of the privacy models and anonymiza-
tion/sanitization techniques for releasing spatio-temporal density in a privacy-
preserving manner. We first illustrated the privacy threats of releasing spatio-
temporal density and described two attacks that can recover individual visits or
even complete trajectories merely from spatio-temporal density. Then, we reviewed
the mainstream privacy models, and distinguished syntactic models (such as k-
anonymity) and semantic models (such as differential privacy). As spatio-temporal
density is a function of the raw mobility data, we identified three main approaches to
anonymize spatio-temporal density: (1) anonymize and release the results of queries
executed on the original mobility data, (2) anonymize and release the original mobil-
ity data (i.e., location trajectories) used to compute the spatio-temporal density, and
(3) anonymize and release the spatio-temporal density directly which is computed
from the original mobility data.
The first approach relies on query auditing, or query perturbation using differen-
tial privacy. Query auditing is computationally expensive, and disregards the back-
ground knowledge of the adversary. Although query perturbation is independent
of the adversarial background knowledge and runs in polynomial time, it ignores
some inherent characteristics of human mobility which could further diminish per-
turbation error. Also, unlike query auditing, perturbation is non-truthful, i.e. releases
falsified location data.
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The second approach can use either a syntactic or a semantic privacy model to
anonymize trajectories. Syntactic anonymization techniques providing k-anonymity
suffer from the curse of dimensionality and provide inaccurate data in general. km-
anonymization has smaller error but guarantees weaker privacy and/or has expo-
nential time complexity in m. In addition, all syntactic privacy guarantees can be
violated with appropriate background knowledge, which is difficult to model in
practice. Semantic anonymization using differential privacy is much more promis-
ing, but again, they use perturbation which is non-truthful. In addition, anonymizing
trajectories usually provides less accurate density estimation than anonymizing the
spatio-temporal density directly. Indeed, density can be modelled accurately with
a model which requires less perturbation than the model of complete trajectories.
Although some trajectory anonymization techniques have larger time complexity,
these are not serious concerns in case of one-shot release.
As the last approach provides the largest accuracy in practice, we detailed the
operation of such an anonymization process and showed its performance in a real-
world application. This demonstration also shows that differential privacy can be a
practical model for the privacy-preserving release of spatio-temporal data, even if it
has large dimension. We also showed that, in order to achieve meaningful accuracy,
the sanitization process has to be carefully customized to the application and public
characteristics of the dataset. The time complexity of this approach is polynomial
and also very fast in practice.
As a conclusion, it is unlikely that there is any “universal” anonymiza-
tion/sanitization solution that fits every application and data, i.e., provides good
accuracy in all scenarios. In particular, achieving the best performance requires find-
ing the most faithful model of the data, such that it withstands perturbation. In case
of spatio-temporal density, clustering and sampling with Fourier-based perturbation
are seemingly the best choices due to the periodic nature and large sensitivity of
location counts.
Finally, we emphasize two important properties of semantic anonymization and
query perturbation with differential privacy. First, unlike all other schemes, includ-
ing query auditing and syntactic trajectory anonymization, differential privacy com-
poses and the privacy loss can be quantified and gracefully degrades by multiple
releases. This is crucial if the data gets updated and should be ”re-anonymized”, or,
there are other independent releases with overlapping set of individuals (e.g., two
CDR datasets about the same city from two different telecom operators). Second,
privacy attacks may rely on very diverse background knowledge, which are diffi-
cult to capture. For example, not until the appearance of the reconstruction attack
in Section 1.1.1 was it clear that individual trajectories can be recovered merely
from spatio-temporal density. Only differential privacy seems to provide adequate
defense (with properly adjusted ε and δ ) against even such sophisticated attacks.
Nevertheless, there are still many interesting future directions to further improve
performance. First, the data generating distribution can be implicitly modeled using
generative artificial neural networks (ANNs) such as Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNNs) [25]. Generative ANNs have exhibited great progress recently and their
representational power has been demonstrated by generating very realistic (but still
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artificial) sequential data such as texts10 or music. The intuition is that, as deep
ANNs can “automatically” model very complex data generating distributions thanks
to their hierarchical structure, they can potentially be used to produce realistic syn-
thetic sequential data such as spatio-temporal densities. Second, current approaches
release the spatio-temporal density only for a limited time interval. For example,
the solution described in Section 4 releases the density for only a single week. To
release density over multiple weeks, one need to use a the composition property
of differential privacy which guarantees (kε,kδ )-DP for k-fold adaptive composi-
tion based on Theorem 1. These are still quite large bounds if we wish to release
the density in the whole year with k = 52. Fortunately, tighter bound has been de-
rived recently, building on the notions of Concentrated Differential Privacy, which
guarantees
(
O(ε
√
k),δ
)
-DP after k adaptive releases [1].
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